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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection and price
competition on the private annuity market in a model with two retirement
periods. In this framework annuity companies can offer contracts with
different payoffs over the periods of retirement. Varying the time structure
of the payoffs affects annuity demand and welfare of individuals with low
and high life expectancy in different ways. By this, annuity purchasers can
be separated according to their survival probabilities. Our main finding is
that a Nash-Cournot equilibrium may not exist; if one exists, it will be a
separating equilibrium. On the other hand, even if a separating equilibrium
does not exist, a Wilson pooling equilibrium exists
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Private life-annuity markets are frequently recognized as being weak. That is, less life-
annuities are demanded than one could expect, given the need to insure against uncertainty
about the duration of life, in order to smooth consumption appropriately over one's lifetime.
To the extent that the low demand is explained by a bequest motive or by the existence of a
public pension system, the weakness is not attributed to an intrinsic problem of this market.
However, there is a further reason put forward in the literature, namely asymmetric
information which leads to adverse selection: The fact that individuals have more information
about their survival probability than annuity companies induces higher annuity demand of
persons with long life expectancy, which in turn drives down the rate of return on annuities
below the rate corresponding to the average probability of survival.
1 As a consequence of
this phenomenon, a loss of welfare arises for persons who cannot buy an appropriate annuity
contract. This shortcoming of the annuity market is supposed to become increasingly
important, because in many countries the existing public pension system, organized
according to the pay-as-you-go method, is expected to allow only a reduced replacement-
ratio in the future, hence increased private insurance will be required.
In the present paper we point at a further consequence of the asymmetric information
problem, in addition to the adverse-selection problem described so far: The time structure of
the payoffs matters. Individuals with low life expectancy will put less weight on the payment
they may not receive in the last period of life than individuals with high life expectancy do.
This fact can be used by firms to offer annuity contracts which are favourable for low-risk
individuals but not for high-risk individuals.
2 We show in a theoretical model that this fact has
important consequences on the functioning of the annuity market.
In the model usually employed for the analysis of annuity markets (see Pauly (1974), Abel
(1986) and Walliser (1998)), there is one period of retirement, and there are two groups of
individuals with differing life expectancy. Competition takes place via prices (i.e. via the rate
of return, that is the pension payment per unit of annuity), which are fixed by the firms.
                                                
1  Empirical evidence suggests that none of these three reasons alone (but only the interaction of adverse
selection, public pension system and bequest motives) can explain the weakness of the market. See, e.g.,
Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, 1990), Walliser (1998), Mitchell et al. (1999).
2  In a recent empirical study of the annuity market in the U.K., Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) present some
evidence that long living individuals indeed prefer contracts with payoffs increasing over time in nominal terms
compared to contracts with constant nominal payoffs.2
Individuals can buy as many annuities as they want. As it is well-known, in this framework
only a pooling equilibrium is possible, where all individuals receive the same rate of return.
We extend this model by introducing two periods of retirement and by assuming that the
payoffs need not be the same in both periods. This implies that contracts are characterized
by two prices, set by the firms. As already noted above, the important aspect in this extended
model is that annuity demand as well as welfare of the individuals are sensitive with respect
to the time structure of the payoffs. This makes it possible for firms to separate individuals
according to their survival probabilities. It turns out that in such a market no Nash-Cournot
equilibrium may exist. If one exists, it will be a separating equilibrium. These findings can be
interpreted as a further explanation of weakness of annuity markets mentioned above.
3
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium in insurance markets is studied by  Rothschild and  Stiglitz
(1976). In their framework firms offer a number of different contracts which specify both a
price and a quantity. Individuals who prefer a higher quantity, are willing to pay a higher price
for it. A prerequisite for the existence of price and quantity competition is that individuals can
buy at most one contract, which may be a reasonable assumption for some insurance
markets, e.g. insurance against accidents, but seems difficult to apply to the annuity market.
4
Consequently, in our model individuals are free to buy as many annuities as they want.
Separation becomes possible because firms can fix two prices instead of a price and a
quantity.
As a potential answer to the question what happens in an insurance market, if no Nash-
Cournot-equilibrium exists, Wilson (1977) introduced a different equilibrium concept which is
based on specific beliefs of firms concerning the reaction of other firms to new contract
offers. We show that a Wilson equilibrium always exists in our model.
Our paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the basic model of annuity demand
under asymmetric information with two periods of retirement. We analyze the effect of a
variation in the time structure of the payoffs on annuity demand and on welfare of an
                                                
3  A related explanation for the weakness of the annuity market is offered by Townley and Boadway (1987).
They also quit the assumption of a single period of retirement but model the duration of retirement in
continuous time. They allow annuity companies to offer contracts characterized by two parameters, namely
the term, i.e. the duration of the contract, and the price (i.e. the constant rate of return). Within this framework
they show that no equilibrium may exist, if it exists, it is either a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium.
4  Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985) make indeed this assumption for the annuity market and derive the
same results as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).3
individual under uncertain lifetime. In Section 3 we turn to the investigation of equilibria.
Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2. Annuity demand in a model with two periods of retirement
2.1 The basic model with asymmetric information
Consider an economy with N individuals who live for a maximum of three periods t = 0,1,2. In
the working period t = 0 individual i earns a fixed labour income w, spends an amount A
i on
annuities and consumes an amount  i
o c . This gives the budget equation for period 0:
i i
o A w c - = .  (2.1)
The individuals retire at the end of period 0. Through the purchase of annuities they make
provision for future consumption in the periods of retirement t = 1,2. An annuity contract is
characterized by the payoffs (q1,q2): An annuity A
i = 1 pays qt units of money to the individual
in the retirement periods t = 1,2, if she survives. In order to concentrate on the design of the
annuity contracts, we assume that neither an interest-bearing saving instrument nor a public
pension system exist. This does not affect the qualitative results and simplifies the analysis.








2 A q c = . (2.3)
Survival to period t = 1 is uncertain and occurs with probability  i
1 p ,  1 0 i
1 < p < . In the same
way, given that an individual is alive in period 1, survival to period 2 occurs with probability
i
2 p ,  1 0 i
2 < p < . Each individual decides on her consumption plan over the uncertain duration
of her retirement by maximizing expected utility from a time-separable utility function 
i U ,






















i + + p p + + p - p + p - = , (2.4)
subject to conditions (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). In (2.4) the function  ) c ( u i
t  describes utility of
consumption per period,  where we assume   0 ) c ( ' u i
t > ,   0 ) c ( ' ' u i
t <  and   ¥ =
ﬁ
) 0 ( ' u lim
0 c
. Notice4
that the specification in (2.4) embodies that the individuals have no bequest motive and do
not discount future consumption for any reason other than risk aversion. (2.4) can be
reduced to












i p p + p + = . (2.4’)
Inserting (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.4’) and differentiating with respect to A
i yields the first
order condition of this maximization problem as











o = p p + p + - . (2.5)
From (2.2) and (2.3) we know that  i
1 c  ￿  i
2 c  depending on q1 ￿ q2. Let A
i(q1,q2) be the annuity
demand determined by (2.5), for given (q1,q2).
From now on we assume that the otherwise identical individuals are divided into two groups i




t p > p  for t = 1,2. Let g and (1 - g) denote the share of the high-risk and low-risk individuals,
resp., with 0 < g < 1. The probabilities  i
t p  and g are public information, known by the annuity
companies. But it is the private information for each individual to know her type, i.e. her
probability of survival. As a consequence, there is an adverse-selection problem in the
annuity market. This is illustrated by the following lemma, which shows that high-risk
individuals buy more annuities than low-risk individuals, given any contract (q1,q2).
Lemma 1: For any contract (q1,q2) an individual with high survival probabilities will demand a




Proof: Annuity demand A
L(q1,q2) of a type-L individual, given that a contract (q1,q2) is
offered, is determined by the first order condition (2.5) for i = L. We consider the derivative of
type H’s expected utility at A
L(q1,q2), i.e.











o p p + p + - . (2.6)
Using (2.5) for i = L and  H
1 p > L
1 p ,  H
2 p > L
2 p , it follows that (2.6) is positive, which means that
utility of a type-H individual will rise, if she increases her annuity demand above A
L(q1,q2). By5
doing so, she reduces consumption in period 0 (marginal utility of consumption will rise due
to concavity of the instantaneous utility function u), but increases consumption in periods 1
and 2 (marginal utility of consumption will fall). Altogether, optimal annuity demand A
H(q1,q2)
of a type-H individual must be above A
L(q1,q2). Q.E.D.
2.2 Separating and pooling contracts
An annuity contract is said to be individually fair, if expected payoffs equal its price, i.e. if
(q1,q2) fulfill









1 = p p - p - , i= L,H.  (2.7)
Obviously, this implies that the annuity companies make zero expected profits, given that
identical individuals buy these contracts. We show that among all individually fair annuity
contracts the one with equal payoffs is preferred.
Lemma 2: Among all individually fair contracts, the one with q1 = q2 is preferred.
Proof: We maximize lifetime utility (2.4’) with respect to q 1 and q 2, subject to (2.7). Using
(2.2) and (2.3), the first-order conditions of this problem are





1 = lp + p , (2.8a)









1 = p lp + p p , (2.8b)
where  l is the  Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (2.7). From (2.8a) and
(2.8b), we find that maximization requires  ) c ( ' u ) c ( ' u i
2
i
1 = , which implies q 1 = q2 for any
arbitrarily given A
i.  Q.E.D.
In the following, we indicate the most preferred individually fair contract by ( i
1 q ˆ , i
2 q ˆ ), where
i
1 q ˆ  =  i





1 p p + p  (see (2.7)). Note that with ( i
1 q ˆ , i
2 q ˆ ) an individual i chooses not only
the same level of consumption in the two retirement periods 1 and 2, but also in her working
period 0. This can be seen from the fact that, as the consumption levels are the same in














o c c c = = .6
From our assumption  H
t
L
t p < p , t = 1,2, it follows that individual fairness for each group can
be fulfilled only with two separate contracts. In contrast, a contract (q1,q2) which is bought by
both groups, is called a pooling contract. For such a contract, the zero-profit condition reads
(for shortness we use A
i instead of A
i(q1,q2))












L = p p - p - g + p p - p - g - , (2.9)
which can also be written as











1 1 = p rp + p p - rp + p - r + , (2.9')




2 1 g - g ” r , that is the ratio of annuity
demand of both groups. Note that r depends on (q1,q2), but for shortness, we usually do not












1 1 q q 1 q q 1 p p - p - > p p - p - . (2.10)
It follows that the LHS in (2.10) is positive and the RHS is negative, otherwise the LHS in
(2.9) would be non-zero. From this we conclude that for the low-risk individuals expected
returns from a pooling contract are lower than required for individual fairness, while for the
high-risk individuals they are higher.
In the Lemmas 3 and 4 below, we consider a pooling contract and investigate the effect of a
marginal change in the payoffs on expected utility and on annuity demand of an individual of
type i = L,H. Clearly, if q1 (or q 2) is increased alone, then both groups profit and buy more
annuities. However, such an increase would produce a loss for the annuity companies.
Hence, the interesting case is when q1 is increased at the expense of q2 (or vice versa), such
that the zero-profit condition (2.9) remains fulfilled.
Starting from a contract with q1 = q2, we characterize the first-round effect on expected utility
and on annuity demand of a marginal increase of q1, when the associated change of q2, such
that (2.9') remains fulfilled, is calculated under the assumption of a constant ratio r of annuity
demand of the two groups.7
Lemma 3: Consider a contract with q1 = q2 which together with A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H fulfills the
zero-profit condition (2.9'). A marginal increase of q 1 (and thus a marginal decrease of q 2),
where (2.9') for fixed r remains fulfilled, makes an individual with high survival probabilities
worse off and an individual of low survival probabilities better off.
Proof: Substituting (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.4’) we get (apply the Envelope Theorem)
) c ( ' u
q
q





















Making use of the fact that  i
2
i
















































p rp + p p
rp + p
p - = . (2.12)
It is straightforward to see that the RHS of (2.12) is smaller than –1 for i = H, and greater
than –1 for i = L, i.e.  1 q q 1 2
H
2 - < ¶ ¶ p  and  1 q q 1 2
L
2 - > ¶ ¶ p . As a consequence, the RHS in
(2.11) is negative for i = H and positive for i = L, which proves the Lemma. Q.E.D.
The foregoing Lemma describes the first-round effect, which is responsible for the negative
result concerning the existence of a pooling contract in equilibrium (see Section 3.1). As one
expects, an individual with low survival probabilities prefers a pooling contract (q1,q2) with
q1 > q2, compared to a contract that offers her equal payoffs, while the opposite holds for an
individual with high survival probabilities. Thus, the annuity companies have an incentive to
design separate contracts for the two groups.
The intuitive reason why a low-risk individual finds a shift of consumption from period 2 to
period 1 attractive (starting from q 1  = q 2) can be explained as follows: If q 1  is increased by
one, q2 is decreased by  1 2 q / q ¶ ¶ , and this decrease is weighted by the individual probability
of survival  L
2 p . Since with a pooling contract the associated decrease of q2 goes more to the
expense of the high-risk individuals, it turns out from (2.9') that  1 2 q / q ¶ ¶  < 1/ L
2 p  (for8
constant r). As a result, the expected loss in period 2,  L
2 p 1 2 q / q ¶ ¶  is lower than one and
type-L individuals profit from a shift towards increasing q1. (Note that due to q1 = q2, marginal
utility is equal in both periods.) By the same reasoning type-H individuals, who expect to live
longer, are better off by a shift towards reducing q1.
Remark: Inspection of the proof of the forgoing Lemma shows that an increase of q1 at the
expense of q2 improves welfare of low-risk individuals, if  L
2
L
1 c c £ . It follows that their most
preferred pooling contract exhibits  L
2
L
1 c c > , i.e. q 1 > q2. By similar reasoning one finds that
the most preferred pooling contract for the high-risk individuals exhibits  H
2
H
1 c c < , i.e. q1 < q2.
The next Lemma characterizes the effect of a marginal change of q 1 (and q 2) on annuity





t - = .
Lemma 4: Consider a contract with q1 = q2 which together with A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H, fulfills the
zero-profit condition (2.9'). The effect of a marginal increase in q1 on the annuity demand of
each individual i = L,H, where (2.9') for fixed r remains fulfilled, depends on the relative risk
aversion in the following way:














































i dq / dA  is determined by implicit differentiation of the first-order condition for annuity
demand,  0 A / U
i i = ¶ ¶ , with respect to q1 as











- = . (2.13)
Since the denominator of the RHS of (2.13) is negative due to the second-order condition of
the maximization problem,  1
i dq / dA  has the same sign as the numerator of the RHS of
(2.13).9
Substituting (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.4') we obtain
( ) ( ) ) c ( ' ' u A q ) c ( ' u
q
q































Using the fact that  i
2
i
1 c c =  for q1 = q2 and substituting R into (2.14), gives






















If R = 1, then (2.15) and thus (2.13) are zero for individuals of both types i = L,H. Otherwise
we determine, as in the proof of Lemma 3,  1 2 q / q ¶ ¶  from the zero-profit condition (2.9') and
find that  1 q q 1 2
H
2 - < ¶ ¶ p  and  1 q q 1 2
L
2 - > ¶ ¶ p . Thus, given that R < 1, (2.15) is negative for
i = H and positive for i = L. The opposite is true for R > 1.  Q.E.D.
This result follows from the fact that, per definition, the effect of an increase of q 1 on
q1u'(q1A
i), i.e. on the marginal utility of A
i in period 1, can be written as (1 – R), and the same
applies to period 2 (note that q1 = q2, initially). Hence, whether an increase of q1 increases or
decreases expected marginal utility of A
i (in both retirement periods together) depends on
) q / q 1 ( 1 2
i
2 ¶ ¶ p + (1 - R). As was argued above, the first term is positive for i = L and negative
for i = H. Finally, in order to see the effect on annuity demand, one concludes easily that an
increase (decrease) of expected marginal utility of A
i in both periods of retirement means that
demand for annuities is raised (reduced, resp.).
3. Equilibria
Introducing two instead of one retirement period in the model allows annuity companies to
offer contracts which differ in the division of the payoffs over time. In this section it is shown
that this implies the possibility of a separating equilibrium, which means that annuity
companies separate individuals according to their survival probabilities. To obtain this result
we make use of the well-known concept of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, which was studied
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in the context of insurance markets. Our result is in contrast
to studies considering one period of retirement only, which find that under price competition
there will be a pooling equilibrium. In Subsection 3.3 we extend the analysis by introducing10
the concept of the Wilson (1977) equilibrium, where it is assumed that firms anticipate
reactions of the other firms to new contract offers, viz. that they will withdraw unprofitable
existing contracts. Since these expectations make a new contract offer less attractive, we
find that in this setting a pooling equilibrium exists, even if a separating equilibrium does not
exist.
3.1 The non-existence of a pooling equilibrium
We call a contract (q1,q2) a pooling equilibrium, if together with A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H, the zero-
profit condition (2.9) is fulfilled and if no other contract exists, which is preferred to (q1,q2) by
at least one group i ˛ {L,H} and which allows a nonnegative profit. Our main result is that in
general no pooling equilibrium exists. As a preparation we show that a pooling contract
(q1,q2), which fulfills the zero-profit condition (2.9), produces positive profits, if it is bought
only by low-risk individuals. By continuity this is true for contracts with payoffs close to (q1,q2)
as well.
Lemma 5: Let (q1,q2) be a pooling contract which together with A
i(q1,q2),  i = L,H, fulfills the
zero-profit condition (2.9). Any contract ( 2 2 1 1 q q , q q d + d + ), which is close enough to (q1,q2)
and which is chosen only by group L (i.e., A
H = 0) allows a nonnegative profit.
Proof: We have already argued that with a pooling contract (q1,q2) the low-risk individuals
receive less expected returns than required for individual fairness (see the considerations
following (2.10)). This in turn means that the profit for an insurance company is positive,
given that only this group chooses the contract (q1,q2).
By continuity, this holds for any contract ( 2 2 1 1 q q , q q d + d + ) in the neighbourhood of (q1,q2). 
Q.E.D.
We now introduce a further assumption on  U
i, in addition to strict concavity of the
instantaneous utility function u. Let indirect utility U
i(q1,q2) for any contract (q1,q2) be defined
in the usual way as utility attained with annuity demand A
i(q1,q2). We assume that


















- for all (q1,q2).  (3.1)11
This condition, which is familiar from other models with asymmetric information, requires that
the slope of an indifference of a low-risk individual is always steeper than that of a high-risk
individual. Hence, indifference curves of the two groups can cross only once. Using the







observes that the condition is certainly fulfilled for the logarithmic or for any  isoelastic utility
function u, as  H
2
L
2 p < p . Single-crossing is needed for a concise formulation of Proposition 1
only; in the remark after the proof the significance of the condition will be discussed
thoroughly, and it will be argued that in general the Proposition holds without this
assumption.
Proposition 1: No pooling equilibrium exists, given the single-crossing condition (3.1).
Proof: Let some contract (q1,q2) with associated A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H, be given, such that the
zero-profit condition (2.9) is fulfilled. We find the effect 
i U d  of a marginal change  ) q , q ( 2 1 d d  of




















, i = L,H, (3.2)
The single-crossing condition implies that the RHS's of the two equations (3.2) are linearly
independent (i.e. there is no k such that 
L U ¶ / 1
H
1 q / U k q ¶ ¶ = ¶  and 
L U ¶ / 2
H
2 q / U k q ¶ ¶ = ¶ ),
hence the two equations (3.2) have a unique solution. Choosing some  0 U
L > d , 0 UH < d
and solving (3.2) for  2 1 q , q d d , one finds a new contract ( 2 2 1 1 q q , q q d + d + ), which is
preferred by group L, but not by group H. By the foregoing Lemma, it also allows a non-
negative profit. (As 
L U d  and 
H U d  can be chosen arbitrarily close to zero,  1 q d  and  2 q d  can
be taken as arbitrarily close to zero as well.) Hence (q1,q2) is not a pooling equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
This result can be illustrated in a diagram where the payoffs q1 and q 2 are drawn on the axis
(see Figure 1). The dashed line ZP denotes the zero-profit condition (2.9) for a pooling











1 p rp + p p rp + p - , where r depends on (q1,q2). Consider any
contract (q1,q2) fulfilling (2.9), i.e. any point on ZP. Due to the single-crossing condition the
slope of the indifference curve U
L corresponding to the low-risk group is steeper than that of
U
H, the indifference curve of the high-risk group. Therefore one can find a contract
(q1+ 2 2 1 q q , q d + d ), close to (q1,q2), which is preferred by the low-risk individuals only - and is,12
therefore, profitable for the annuity companies, as Lemma 5 tells us. Hence (q1,q2) does not
represent a pooling equilibrium.
Figure 1
By means of Figure 1 the significance of the single-crossing condition can be discussed. One
observes immediately that the result of Proposition 1 certainly holds as long as the slopes of
U
L and U
H differ in (q1,q2), independently of which one is steeper. Even if U
L and U
H have the
same slope, the result holds, given that the slope of ZP is different. In this case one can find
another pooling contract ( 2 2 1 1 q q , q q d + d + ) close to (q1,q2) which is preferred by both
groups and produces non-negative profits. Only if there exists a point on ZP in which the
slopes of ZP, U
L and U
H are identical, this represents a pooling equilibrium. Clearly, this case
can occur for very specific parameter constellations only, a small perturbation of g or of the
i
t p  would destroy the equilibrium. From these considerations we can conclude that in general
Proposition 1 holds without assuming the single-crossing condition.
3.2 The possibility of a separating equilibrium
We call a set of two contracts ( L
2
L
1 q , q ), ( H
2
H
1 q , q ) a separating equilibrium, if each fulfills the
respective zero-profit condition (2.7), if group L does not prefer ( H
2
H
1 q , q ) to ( L
2
L
1 q , q ) and vice
versa, i.e. if








H ‡ , (3.3)








L ‡ , (3.4)13
and if no other contract exists, which is preferred to ( i
2
i
1 q , q ) by at least one group i ˛ {L,H}
and which allows a nonnegative profit.
We show that a separating equilibrium may, but need not exist, by referring to the logarithmic
utility function. With that, lifetime utility (2.4') for an individual i = L,H reads












i p p + p + = . (3.5)
(3.5) has two convenient properties: (i) As mentioned above, the single-crossing condition
(3.1) is fulfilled, since at any (q1,q2) the slope of the indifference curve, which is  ) q /( q 1
i
2 2 p - ,
is flatter for a type-H individual than for a type-L individual. (ii) Annuity demand of any
individual  i = L,H does not depend on the payoffs, since the coefficient of relative risk
aversion R is equal to one (see Lemma 4 and (A1) in the Appendix). These properties help to
keep the analytical and graphical analysis simple.
Proposition 2: For appropriate g and  i
t p , t = 1,2, i = L,H, a separating equilibrium ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ),
( L
1 q , L
2 q ) with the properties
(i)  the zero-profit conditions (2.7) for i = L,H are fulfilled for each contract,
(ii)  H
1 q ˆ  =  H
2 q ˆ ,  L
1 q >  L
2 q ,
(iii)  type-H individuals are indifferent between ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ) and ( L
1 q ,  L
2 q ),
exists.
Proof: A numerical example for the existence of such an equilibrium is provided in the
Appendix.  Q.E.D.
An intuition for Proposition 2 is derived from geometric arguments (see Figure 2). Each
contract of a separating equilibrium must fulfill the zero-profit conditions (2.7) for the specific
group, drawn as ZP
i with slope  i
2 / 1 p - , i = L,H. Observe that ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ), the contract which,
among all individually fair contracts (i.e. those on ZP
H), is most preferred by type-H
individuals (see Lemma 2), must be part of the equilibrium: Any other contract on ZP
H is
dominated by ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ), and firms need not care whether type-L individuals might choose that
contract, because this would only increase the profit.
However, firms supplying a separate contract to the type-L individuals must care that this
contract is not chosen by the high-risk individuals, because then they would make a loss.14
This implies that ( L
1 q ˆ , L
2 q ˆ ), i.e. the contract on ZP
L most preferred by the L-type individuals,
cannot be part of the equilibrium, because it lies above 
H U ˆ , the indifference curve of the
type-H individuals through ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ). The best separate contract which can be offered to the
low-risk individuals, is ( L
1 q , L
2 q ), where 
H U ˆ  crosses ZP
L. There the self-selection constraint
(3.3) is fulfilled with equality. As ZP
L is a straight line, there exists a second point of
intersection with 
H U ˆ , but this lies below the indifference curve 
L U  through ( L
1 q , L
2 q ), due to
the fact that 
L U  cannot cross 
H U ˆ  to the left of ( L
1 q , L
2 q ). For the same reason, type-L
individuals prefer ( L
1 q , L
2 q ) to ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ), hence (3.4) is fulfilled.
Figure 2
The properties of the separating equilibrium correspond to familiar findings for other models
with asymmetric information: Individuals in the "best" group (in our case: the long-living
individuals) can buy their "first-best" contract, while individuals in the other group can only
buy a "distorted" contract, in order to keep the former away from buying the contract
designed for the latter, i.e., to avoid pooling.
However, the next proposition shows that such a solution does not always exist.
Proposition 3: For appropriate g and  i
t p , t = 1,2, i = L,H, no separating equilibrium exists.15
Proof: A numerical example for the non-existence of such an equilibrium is provided in the
Appendix.  Q.E.D.
We show that the contract set ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ) and ( L
1 q , L
2 q ) may not be an equilibrium, because
there may exist a pooling contract that allows a non-negative profit and is preferred by both
groups i = L,H.  The argument is demonstrated graphically in Figure 2. Consider some
pooling contract that lies above the indifference curves 
H U ˆ  and 
L U , but on or below the
dashed line ZP, again indicating the zero-profit condition (2.9) for pooling-contracts (Note
that in case of logarithmic utility, ZP is indeed a straight line, since annuity demand A
i and
thus r do not depend on (q1,q2)). Obviously, any such pooling contract, e.g.  ( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ),
dominates the potential separating equilibrium  ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ), ( L
1 q , L
2 q ) and produces a non-
negative profit. The existence of such a contract is less likely, the greater the difference
between the survival probabilities of both groups i = L,H and the higher g. For example, the
zero-profit line ZP in Figure 2 simply shifts to the left for a higher share of type-H individuals.
If it does not cross 
L U , no dominating pooling contract exists.
3.3 The Wilson equilibrium
In Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 we have analyzed the existence of Nash-Cournot equilibria.
These are defined on the basic assumption that firms, when offering a new contract, take the
other firms' contract offers as given. Obviously, various different beliefs of firms concerning
the reaction of other firms can be formulated. Wilson (1977) introduced the following
approach: Let a set of existing contracts be offered. A firm, considering a new contract offer,
beliefs that existing contracts are withdrawn, if they become unprofitable due to the new
contract offer. As a consequence, former buyers of the existing contracts will turn to the new
offer, which influences profitability of the latter. Accordingly, a Wilson pooling equilibrium
(q1,q2) has to fulfill the property that no other contract exists which is preferred by at least one
group i = L,H and allows a nonnegative profit, given that (q1,q2) is withdrawn if it becomes
unprofitable. The analogous qualification has to be added to the definition of the separating
equilibrium in order to describe a Wilson separating equilibrium.
One observes immediately that this qualification makes the definition less restrictive (new
contract offers are less attractive). As a consequence, any Nash-Cournot equilibrium is also
a Wilson equilibrium. Moreover, we have:16
Proposition 4: A Wilson equilibrium exists, even if the separating equilibrium does not exist.
It is a pooling equilibrium, denoted by ( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ), with the following properties:
(i)  The zero-profit condition (2.9) is fulfilled.
(ii)  ( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ) is the most preferred pooling contract for the type-L individuals.
Proof: The proof is derived from geometric arguments (see Figure 2). Consider the pooling
contract ( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ). We show that no firm has an incentive to deviate from ( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ): In case that
a contract ( 1 1 q q ~ d + , 2 2 q q ~ d + ) is offered which is preferred by the low-risk, but not by the
high-risk individuals (compare Figure 1), the original contract ( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ), being then purchased
by the high-risk individuals only, makes negative profits and will be withdrawn from the
market. Consequently, the type-H individuals will also accept the contract  ( 1 1 q q ~ d + ,
2 2 q q ~ d + ), which therefore will turn out to be unprofitable and will not be offered. As a result,
( 2 1 q ~ , q ~ ) is a Wilson pooling equilibrium. Q.E.D
A numerical example for a Wilson pooling equilibrium is provided in the Appendix.
4. Concluding remarks
Considering a life-cycle model with more than one period of retirement allows the formulation
of an additional important aspect of the annuity market: It is an attractive strategy for
companies to offer annuity contracts, for which the pension payoffs are not constant over the
periods of retirement, since individuals with different life expectancies will put different
weights on the payment they may or may not receive in the last period of life. In the present
study we have analyzed the consequence of this possibility on the existence of equilibria in
the private annuity market under price competition and asymmetric information. Our main
finding was that in this framework a Nash-Cournot equilibrium may not exist; if one exists, it
will be a separating equilibrium. On the other hand, even if a separating equilibrium does not
exist, a Wilson pooling equilibrium exists.
By assuming only one period of retirement, previous studies have neglected the fact that the
time structure of the payoffs matters, which lead then to the conclusion that under price
competition and adverse selection a pooling equilibrium always exists. So, in a general
perspective, annuity markets are actually more complicated than it has been supposed so far17
and the existence of a stable outcome is less likely. This complexity may be seen as a further
explanation why annuity markets are weak.
A further consequence of our extended model is that it should change the view guiding
empirical studies. Usually, they start from the premise that the annuity market should ideally
offer a pooling contract for all risks, and study the adverse-selection phenomenon by
comparing life-expectancy of annuity purchasers with the average life-expectancy of the
population. By looking at a specific annuity contract, the magnitude of adverse selection is
measured by the difference between the expected rate of return for the general population
and the expected rate of return for the  subpopulation of annuitants.
5 Instead, our result
suggests that a primary object of investigation should be the question of whether separating
indeed occurs and to which extent.
In a recent empirical paper, Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) study the selection effects across
three different types of annuity contracts: fixed nominal payoffs, five percent annually
escalating nominal payoffs and inflation-indexed payoffs. Since the authors do not have
contract-specific mortality probabilities, they compute the expected present value of the
payoffs, based on the average population mortality. They show that the expected present
value of inflation-linked annuities is about eight percent lower than that of fixed nominal
annuities and that of the escalating nominal annuities is about five percent lower than that of
fixed nominal annuities. The authors take this result as an indirect evidence that index-linked
and escalating annuities are selected by individuals with high life-expectancies: Only these
individuals have an incentive to buy such contracts, because for them the expected present
value of the payoffs, based on their low mortality rates, is higher and may exceed that of
annuities with fixed nominal payoffs. This first evidence from the U.K., which is consistent
with our theoretical results, points into the direction that selection across different types of
annuity contracts is of some relevance for the annuity market.
Private annuity insurance is becoming more important, because of the expected decline of
the replacement ratio offered by the public pension system in many countries. Our
contribution adds to the set of studies expressing doubts on the adequate functioning of the
annuity market. Clarifying this issue further, appears to be a prominent task for future
theoretical and empirical research.
                                                
5  See, e.g., Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, 1990), Walliser (1998), Mitchell et al. (1999).18
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Appendix: Numerical illustration of the (non-)existence of separating equilibria
For logarithmic utility (see(3.5)), annuity demand is computed from (2.5) as
w
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which is independent from the rates of return (q1,q2), as mentioned in the text.
The separating equilibrium contracts ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ) and  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1  are computed as follows: Solving
the zero- profit condition (2.7) for i = H and setting  H
1 q =  H












The contract  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1  for type-L individual, is determined by the self-selection constraint
(3.3), and the zero-profit-condition (2.7) for i = L. Assuming equality, one derives from (3.3)
(making use of (A1), (A2), (2.2), (2.3) and (3.5))
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(A3) can be solved to compute  L
1 q , then  L
2 q  follows from (2.7).
In order to proof that the contracts ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ) and  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1  indeed constitute an equilibrium,
we have to show that there is no pooling contract which fulfills the zero-profit condition (2.9')
and is preferred by individuals of both types i = L,H. To do so, we concentrate on the pooling
contract ( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ ) which together with (A1)  fulfills the zero-profit condition (2.9') and is
preferred most by a type-L individual. This is the accurate procedure, since an individual of
type H is certainly better off with the pooling contract ( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ ) than with her own contract
( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ), given a type-L individual prefers ( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ ) to  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1 . Maximization of (3.5) for i = L
subject to (2.9') gives
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where  ) A ) 1 /(( ) A ( L H g - g = r . Thus, whenever the low-risk individuals are worse off at
( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ ), the contracts ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ) and  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1  constitute an equilibrium. Otherwise they do
not and the contract ( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ ) is the pooling equilibrium according to the definition of Wilson.
In Table 1 we provide numerical examples, for which annuity demand A
i, the contracts
( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ),  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1  and ( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ ), as well as expected utility of individuals of both types i = H,
L, U
H and U
L, at these contracts are calculated explicitly. We choose three different
scenarios, which differ in the share g of the high risk individuals (scenario 1 and 2) and in the
survival probability  L
2 p  of the type-L individuals in period 2 (scenario 1 and 3). In scenario 1
the contracts ( H
1 q ˆ , H
2 q ˆ ) and  ) q , q ( L
2
L
1  constitute an equilibrium. Taking this as a reference
point, we show that a lower share g of type-H individuals (scenario 2) and a higher survival
probability  L
2 p  of the type-L individuals in period 2 (scenario 3) entail that there is no
separating equilibrium in a competitive annuity market. In these both scenarios ( 1 q ~ , 2 q ~ )
constitute the Wilson pooling equilibrium.21
Table 1:  Numerical illustration of the (non-)existence of separating equilibria
Scenario 1: Existence of separating equilibrium
 w = 1000, g = 0.5
H
1 p = 0.8,  H
2 p = 0.6,  A
H = 561.4
L
1 p = 0.6,  L
2 p = 0.2,  A
L = 418.6
Scenario 2:  Non-existence of a
separating equilibrium
 w = 1000, g g = 0.2
H
1 p = 0.8,  H
2 p = 0.6,  A
H = 561.4
L
1 p = 0.6,  L
2 p = 0.2,  A
L = 418.6
Scenario 3:  Non-existence of a
separating equilibrium
 w = 1000, g = 0.5
H
1 p = 0.8,  H
2 p = 0.6,  A
H = 561.4
L
1 p = 0.6,  L
2 p = 0.5,  A
L = 473.7
contracts H U
L U contracts H U
L U contracts H U
L U
H
1 q ˆ =0.781,  H
2 q ˆ =0.781
L
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1 q ~ =1.166,  2 q ~ =0.511 13.987 10.724 1 q ~ =1.282,  2 q ~ =0.792 14.273 10.833 1 q ~ =0.941,  2 q ~ =0.838 14.053 11.721